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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : Case No. 890088-CA 
v. t 
THOMAS M. TEBBS, » Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction based on a no contest 
plea to two counts of communications fraud, Utah Code Ann. § 76-
10-1801 (Supp. 1989). Since the conviction was for second degree 
felonies, this Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The sole issue on appeal is whether Utah Code Ann. 
S 76-10-1801(7) (Supp. 1989) shifts the burden of proof on the 
mental state element to the defendant, in violation of the due 
process clauses of the United States and Utah Constitutions. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-1801 (Supp. 1989) is pertinent 
to the resolution of the issue presented on appeal. The text of 
that statute is contained in the addendum to this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On March 2, 1987, defendant was charged by information 
with sixteen counts of communications fraud, all second degree 
felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (Supp. 
1989) and eight counts of sale of unregistered securities, all 
third degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
S 61-1-7 (1986) (Record [hereafter R.] at 80-92). On June 3, 
1987, an amended information, charging the same counts but 
changing one word in each count, was filed (R. at 93-104). After 
preliminary hearing and the filing of memoranda from both sides, 
the circuit court judge dismissed the counts of sale of 
unregistered securities and bound over the communication fraud 
counts (R. at 5). 
The State moved to amend the information again, which 
motion was granted by the district court. The matter was 
remanded to the circuit court for another preliminary hearing (R. 
at 140). A second amended information charging eleven counts of 
conununication fraud was filed, and preliminary hearing was waived 
(R. at 10-18) . 
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the amended 
information, claiming that the communications fraud statute was 
unconstitutional (R. at 155-73). The trial court evidently 
denied that motion and the matter proceeded to trial to the bench 
in the district court (R. at 187). After the first day of trial, 
defendant accepted a plea bargain and pled no contest to two 
counts of communications fraud (R. at 187-88). This plea was 
entered conditionally, with defendant reserving his right to 
appeal the issue of the constitutionality of the communications 
fraud statute (R. 210 at 2). 
Defendant was sentenced to a term of not less than one 
nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison and ordered 
to pay a fine and restitution. He was placed on probation for 
eighteen months, and the judge issued a certificate of probable 
cause (R. at 202 and 192). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The facts pertinent to this appeal are contained in the 
Statement of the Case. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Contrary to defendant's argument, Utah Code Ann. § 76-
10-1801(1) (Supp. 1989) specifies the culpable mental state 
required for the commission of communications fraud; it is not 
necessary to resort to Utah Code Ann. S 76-2-102 (Supp. 1989) to 
determine a culpable mental state. 
Additionally, $ 76-10-1801(7) cannot reasonably be 
construed to shift the burden of proving the requisite mental 
state to the defendant in violation of due process. As a 
practical matter, that subsection amounts to nothing more than an 
explanation of the State's burden to prove the requisite mental 
state set forth in S 76-10-1801(1). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
UTAH'S COMMUNICATION FRAUD STATUTE DOES NOT 
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY SHIFT THE BURDEN OF PROOF 
TO A DEFENDANT ON THE MENTAL STATE ELEMENT. 
Defendant argues that Utah's communications fraud 
statute, Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-1801 (Supp. 1989), by its terms 
shifts the burden of proof on the mental state element to a 
defendant and therefore on its face violates the due process 
clauses of the state and federal constitutions. See U.S. Const. 
amend. XIV; Utah Const, art. I, § 7. He claims that § 76-10-
1801(1) does not specify a culpable mental state, thus requiring 
the application of Utah Code Ann. S 76-2-102 (Supp. 1989) for 
specification of that mental state, and that S 76-10-1801(7), 
which identifies an "affirmative defense," then operates to shift 
the burden of proof to the defendant on the mental state element 
of the offense in violation of due process. Because defendant 
does not provide any independent analysis of article I, section 7 
of the Utah Constitution, the State will address his due process 
Section 76-2-102 provides: 
Every offense not involving strict 
liability shall require a culpable mental 
state, and when the definition of the offense 
does not specify a culpable mental state and 
the offense does not involve strict 
liability, intent, knowledge, or recklessness 
shall suffice to establish criminal 
responsibility. An offense shall involve 
strict liability if the statute defining the 
offense clearly indicates a legislative 
purpose to impose criminal responsibility for 
commission of the conduct prohibited by the 
statute without requiring proof of any 
culpable mental state. 
argument as though the state and federal due process clauses 
provide the same degree of protection to a defendant in this 
context. See, e.g., State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 n.5 
(Utah 1988) ("As a general rule, we will not engage in a state 
constitutional analysis unless an argument for different analyses 
under the state and federal constitutions is briefed."); State v. 
Holmes, 774 P.2d 506, 508 n.l (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (declining to 
analyze state constitutional issue). 
A. Section 76-10-1801(1) Specifies A Culpable 
Mental State. 
Defendant's initial claim that S 76-10-1801(1) does not 
specify a culpable mental state, and that resort to S 76-2-102 is 
therefore necessary, can be disposed of summarily. Utah Code 
Ann. S 76-2-101 (Supp. 1989) provides in pertinent part: 
No person is guilty of an offense unless his 
conduct is prohibited by law and: 
(1) He acts intentionally, knowingly, 
recklessly, with criminal negligence, or 
with a mental state otherwise specified in 
the statute defining the offense, as the 
definition of the offense reguires[.] 
[Empha sis added.] 
Section 76-10-1801(1) states in pertinent part: 
Any person who has devised any scheme or 
artifice to defraud another or to obtain from 
another money, property, or anything of value 
by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, 
representations, promises, or material 
omissions, and who communicates directly or 
indirectly with any person by any means for 
the purpose of executing or concealing the 
scheme of artifice is guilty of: 
-5-
This section plainly sets forth both the forbidden acts and the 
requisite mental states for the offense. In the first part of 
subsection (1), a person must devise a scheme or artifice with 
the intent or purpose to defraud another or to obtain property 
from another through false or fraudulent means. Although that 
part does not use the phrase "with the intent or purpose," the 
obvious import of the language used is that a fraudulent or 
deceitful mental state is required in the devising of the scheme 
or artifice. That mental state constitutes "a mental state 
otherwise specified in the statute defining the offense" as 
required for criminal responsibility under § 76-2-101(1). 
Any argument that such an interpretation of the first 
part of S 76-10-1801(1) is an unwarranted infusion of an absent 
mental state is diffused by State v. Fontanay 680 P.2d 1042 (Utah 
1984), where the Utah Supreme Court was called upon to determine 
which of the culpable mental states identified in § 76-2-101(1) 
and required by S 76-2-102 was "superimposed" on the depraved 
indifference provision of the second degree murder statute (Utah 
Code Ann. S 76-5-203(1)(c) (Supp. 1984) (amended 1986)). The 
Court, interpreting language which gave little or no indication 
of a culpable mental state, held that "the third mental state 
specified by S 76-2-102, 'knowledge,' fits perfectly into the 
sense of S 76-5-203(1)(c)." 680 P.2d at 1046. The Court 
recognized its obligation to determine the requisite mental state 
even though the statutory provision was ambiguous in that regard: 
This effort is prescribed by our statutory 
duty to construe the provisions of the 
Criminal Code "according to the fair import 
of their terms to promote justice and to 
effect the . • . general purposes of section 
76-1-104" to w[d]efine adequately the conduct 
and mental state which constitutes each 
offense" and to "[pjrescribe penalties which 
are proportionate to the seriousness of the 
offenses . . . ." SS 76-1-106; 76-1-104(2) & 
(3). 
680 P.2d at 1046. In light of this analysis, the first part of 
S 76-10-1801(1) is properly interpreted to include a purpose to 
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defraud or to deceive as the culpable mental state. Indeed, the 
language of S 76-10-1801(1), if ambiguous at all on this point, 
is not nearly as ambiguous as that interpreted in Fontana. 
The second part of S 76-10-1801(1) sets forth an 
additional requisite mental state: "for the purpose of executing 
or concealing the scheme or artifice." This specified mental 
state is tied to the act of communicating and constitutes "a 
mental state otherwise specified in the statute defining the 
offense" as required for criminal responsibility under § 76-2-
101(1). Like a purpose to defraud or to deceive, "the purpose of 
executing or concealing the scheme or artifice" is a cognizable 
culpable mental state under Utah criminal law. See State v. 
Asay, 631 P.2d 861, 863 (Utah 1981) (discussed below at fn. 2). 
In sum, contrary to defendant's argument, S 76-10-
1801(1) clearly includes and specifies the culpable mental state 
required for commission of the offense. Because the provision 
specifies a culpable mental state in accordance with § 76-2-101, 
That "a purpose to defraud or to deceive" is a cognizable 
culpable mental state under Utah criminal law is apparent from 
State v. Asay, 631 P.2d 861, 863 (Utah 1981), where the Utah 
Supreme Court recognized that a purpose to deprive another of his 
or her property, as set forth in the theft statute (Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-404 (1978)), constitutes the requisite mental state 
for the commision of that offense. 
it is not necessary, as defendant contends, to look to § 76-2-102 
for the infusion of an intentional, knowing, or reckless mental 
state* 
B. Utah Code Ann. $ 76-10-1801(7) Does Not Uncon-
stitutionally Shift The Burden Of Proof On The 
Mental State Element To The Defendant. 
Defendant's additional claim that S 76-10-1801(7) 
operates to shift the burden of proof on the mental state element 
of the offense to the defendant in violation of due process is 
similarly without merit. That section reads: 
It is an affirmative defense to 
prosecution under this section that the 
pretenses, representations, promises, or 
material omissions made or omitted by the 
defendant were not made or omitted knowingly 
or with a reckless disregard for the truth. 
Although the legislature's use of the term "affirmative defense" 
was probably ill-advised, a reasonable interpretation of 
subsection (7) in the context of the statute as a whole avoids 
the due process violation claimed by defendant. 
First, as discussed earlier, S 76-10-1801(1) clearly 
sets forth the prohibited acts and the requisite mental states 
necessary to constitute the offense. There is no dispute that 
the State carries the burden of proving each of those elements 
beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); 
State v. Starks, 627 P.2d 88, 92 (Utah 1981); Utah Code Ann. 
S 76-1-501 (1978). Section 76-10-1801(7) cannot reasonably be 
interpreted to alter the State's burden. Despite the use of the 
term "affirmative defense," subsection (7) is most reasonably 
read as nothing more than a statement of conditions under which a 
defendant cannot be found guilty of the offense, without 
allocating any burden to the defendant to prove the absence of a 
requisite mental state. Under subsection (1), the State has the 
burden to prove a purpose or intent to defraud or to deceive, and 
that burden is not in any way lessened by subsection (7). 
Traditionally, the law has recognized that a statement, 
representation, or omission made knowingly or with a reckless 
disregard for the truth can be equivalent to intent or purpose to 
defraud or to deceive. See, e.g., United States v. White, 765 
F.2d 1469, 1482 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v. Mackay, 491 
F.2d 616, 623 (10th Cir. 1973), cert, denied, 416 U.S. 972 
(1974). Thus, the State, in presenting proof of an intent or 
purpose to defraud or to deceive under the first part of 
subsection (1), necessarily would have to prove that any 
pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions were 
made either knowingly or with a reckless disregard for the truth. 
Subsection (7) does not relieve the State of that burden; it 
merely serves to explain the State's burden under subsection (1). 
This is so in spite of the unusual use of the term "affirmative 
defense," in that, traditionally an affirmative defense involves 
the existence of some additional circumstance which either 
mitigates criminal culpability or relieves the individual of all 
criminal responsibility. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305 
(Supp. 1989) (defense of mental illness); Utah Code Ann. S§ 76-2-
401 to -405 (1978 & Supp. 1989) (defense of justification 
excluding criminal responsibility). Because subsection (7) 
refers to no additional circumstance and speaks only in terms of 
the absence of a mental state that the State is clearly required 
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to prove under subsection (1), it does not define an affirmative 
defense in the traditional sense. 
Therefore, this Court should construe subsection (7) as 
nothing more than an explanation of the State's clear burden to 
prove a culpable mental state under subsection (1), and further 
rule that, despite the use of the term "affirmative defense," 
subsection (7) does not set forth an affirmative defense in the 
traditional sense. Finally, the Court should find that 
subsection (7), when read in the context of the statute as a 
whole, does not shift the burden to the defendant to disprove a 
requisite mental state. By construing subsection (7) in this 
manner, the Court avoids defendant's facial due process challenge 
to the statute. It is a settled principle that an appellate 
court, in construing a statute, must endeavor to give it a 
meaning that will render it constitutional whenever possible. 
State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 497-98 (Utah 1988) (Zimmerman, J., 
concurring separately, joined by Stewart and Durham, J.J.). 
Even if this Court were to construe subsection (7) as 
defining a true affirmative defense, the provision does not 
operate to shift the burden of proof on an element of the offense 
to the defendant in violation of due process. Under Utah law, 
when an affirmative defense is placed in issue, either through 
the prosecution's evidence or evidence produced by the defendant, 
the State carries the burden of disproving the existence of the 
affirmative defense beyond a reasonable doubt in addition to its 
burden of proving all the elements of the crime charged beyond a 
reasonable doubt; the defendant does not carry the burden of 
persuasion on the affirmative defense. State v. Knoll, 712 P.2d 
211, 214-15 (Utah 1985); State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 82 n.7 
(Utah), cert, denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982). Therefore, under 
general principles of Utah law relating to affirmative defenses, 
subsection (7), if considered an affirmative defense provision, 
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does not shift the ultimate burden of proof to the defendant. 
At most, it might be argued that, as with other affirmative 
defenses, the defendant may in some instances have the burden of 
production (which, in Utah, is still a very low threshold for the 
defendant). See Knoll, 712 P.2d at 214-15. However, given the 
unique nature of the "affirmative defense" purportedly set forth 
in subsection (7)—i.e., "that the pretenses, representations, 
promises, or material omissions made or omitted by the defendant 
Contrary to the implication in appellant's brief, the United 
States Supreme Court case of Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 
(1975) is not applicable to this case. The Supreme Court held 
that Mullaney should be classified as a presumption of intent 
case rather than an affirmative defense case, and therefore 
offers little, if any, support on the issue of affirmative 
defenses. See Smart v. Leeke, No. 87-7737, slip op. at 9 (4th 
Cir. May 4, 1989). In Mullaney, the Maine trial court had 
instructed the jury that "malice aforethought" (which was the 
element which distinguished murder from manslaughter) was 
presumed to exist unless the defendant proved that he acted in 
the heat of passion. The Supreme Court held that this 
presumption of intent was a violation of due process. Id. at 520 
and 522, n. 31. The Utah Communications Fraud statute, read in 
conjunction with Sections 76-1-501 through 504, does not 
establish any presumption that intent exists. 
Furthermore, all of the Utah cases cited by appellant, i.e. 
State v. Chambers, 709 P.2d 321 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); State v. 
Sorensen, 758 P.2d 466 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); State v. Turner, 736 
P.2d 1043 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), are mandatory rebuttable 
presumption cases which are not applicable to affirmative 
defenses. Those cases involve the creation of mandatory 
presumptions of intent or knowledge which then would cast the 
burden on a defendant to rebut the presumption of intent or 
knowledge. Utah case law does not create a presumption of intent 
in affirmative defense cases. 
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were not made or omitted knowingly or with a reckless disregard 
for the truth,M as a practical matter the defendant is not 
required to do anything to place the affirmative defense in 
issue. This is so because whether the pretenses, 
representations, promises, or material omissions made by the 
defendant were made knowingly or with a reckless disregard for 
the truth is automatically an issue in the prosecution's case-in-
chief. The State must necessarily prove the existence of one of 
those mental states to carry its burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt a purpose or intent to defraud or to deceive 
under § 76-10-1801(1). In short, the burden-shifting problem 
identified by defendant simply does not exist. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, the Court should 
reject defendant's facial due process challenge to § 76-10-1801 
and affirm his convictions. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 2^ day of September, 
1989. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
X 
CHARLENE BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Respondent were mailed, postage prepaid, 
to Stephen R. McCaughey and Patricia Geary, Attorneys for 
Appellant, 72 East Fourth South, Suite 330, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111, this Qfy- day of September, 1989. 
^L^J 
_1 **_ 
ADDENDUM 
76-10-1801. Communications fraud. 
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud another 
or to obtain from another money, property, or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omis-
sions, and who communicates directly or indirectly with any person by any 
means for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or artifice is 
guilty of: 
(a) a class B misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or 
thing obtained or sought to be obtained is $100 or less; 
(b) a class A misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or 
thing obtained or sought to be obtained is more than $100 but does not 
exceed $1,000; 
(c) a third degree felony when the value of the property, money, or 
thing obtained or sought to be obtained is more than $1,000 but does not 
exceed $10,000; 
(d) a second degree felony when the value of the property, money, or 
thing obtained or sought to be obtained is more than $10,000 but does not 
exceed $100,000; 
(e) a second degree felony when the object of the scheme or artifice to 
defraud is other than the obtaining of something of monetary value; and 
(f) a first degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing 
obtained or sought to be obtained is $100,000 or more. 
(2) The determination of the degree of any offense under Subsection (1) 
shall be measured by the total value of all property, money, or things obtained 
or sought to be obtained by the scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) 
except as provided in Subsection (l)(e). 
(3) Reliance on the part of any person is not a necessary element of the 
offense described in Subsection (1). 
(4) An intent on the part of the perpetrator of any offense described in 
Subsection (1) to permanently deprive any person of property, money, or thing 
of value is not a necessary element of the offense. 
(5) Each separate communication made for the purpose of executing or 
concealing a scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) is a separate act 
and offense of communication fraud. 
(6) To communicate as described in Subsection (1) means to bestow, convey, 
make known, recount, impart; to give by way of information; to talk over; or to 
transmit information. Means of communication include, but are not limited 
to, use of the mail, telephone, telegraph, radio, television, newspaper, com-
puter, and spoken and written communication. 
(7) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this section that the 
pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions made or omitted 
by the defendant were not made or omitted knowingly or with a reckless 
disregard for the truth. 
History: C. 1953, 76-10-1801, enacted by 
L. 1985, ch. 157, I 2. 
